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THE FAIR DMSION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
DAVID A. ANDERSON*
I. DIVIDING THE LAND IN BETWEEN
Disputes over natural resources predate Homo sapiens, and
persist in a host of costly and inefficient forms. When parties contest
resource ownership or use, the resulting disputes exact a toll on
everyone involved, and can hinder the flow of benefits from the
contested resource. The elongation of disputes over forest resources,
for example, can prolong both harvesting and reforestation.' A better
understanding of the impediments to timely and fair settlement is
needed to guide the formation of new dispute resolution techniques
and distinguish those without merit. Successful remedies will reduce
the costs and undesirable repercussions of disputes over natural
resources, and provide relief for those involved in a broader range of
disputes.
This article outlines the problems with existing settlement
devices and explains, for the first time in the language of legal
authorities and natural resource practitioners, changes in legal policy
that could successfully reduce the risk of bargaining breakdown. The
article emphasizes solutions to disputes involving natural resources.
Whether the disputes are between buyers and sellers or among
potential owners, the benefits of fair and timely dispute resolution are
often shared by a larger segment of society.2
With the implementation of more efficient methods,
resources to be conserved for their environmental value can obtain
their protected status with greater expediency, and resources more
suitable for development can be tapped without imposing a larger-
than-necessary burden on those directly or indirectly involved.
Consider the following scenario, which will serve as an
example in the discussions that follow. Annabelle and Barclay are
engaged in a dispute over the family estate. The 200-acre parcel
includes ten forested acres on one side and a ten-acre lake on the
Paul G. Blazer Associate Professor of Economics, Centre College, Danville,
Kentucky. B.A., University of Michigan, M.A., Ph.D., Duke University. The author wishes to
thank Gretchen Gleaves, Jacob Martin, Karring Moan, Hannah Saufley, and Trent Spurlock for
providing excellent research assistance. The author also wishes to thank the Kentucky Real
Estate Commission for providing financial support.
'Environmental Defense Organization, World Bank Pledges a New Policy on
Rainforests, 22 Environmental Defense Newsletter 1 (November, 1991)
<http://www.edf.org/lpubs/Newsletter/1991/nov/d world bank.html>.2Associated Press, State to Speed up Pollution Control, Seattle Times Online
(January 15, 1998) <http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/local/html98/ooll 01 1598.html>.
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other. The 180 acres in between are cleared and relatively uniform.
Annabelle favors the lake and has little use for forested land.
Barclay prefers the forested land and has little taste for the lake. The
market value of the land, regardless of its topography, is $1000 per
acre. Annabelle claims rights to the majority of the land based on her
family's tradition that the estate goes to the first-born child in each
generation. Barclay claims rights to the majority of the land because,
rather than working to develop a career and amass savings as
Annabelle did, he devoted the last seven years of his life and
considerable resources to caring for their aging parents and the
property in question.
If the case goes to trial, they both anticipate that Annabelle
will receive a parcel with the lake, Barclay will receive the forested
tract, and much of the land in between will have to be sold to pay for
litigation costs. Barclay currently holds the deed, and would pay
approximately $40,000 in hourly attorneys' fees in a court battle with
Annabelle. As the plaintiff, Annabelle expects she would pay
roughly $30,000 in contingent fees if the case went to trial. The
challenge is thus to divide the land in between without incurring the
costs of trial.
Answers to the question of how to divide the land in between
in this scenario will likewise resolve a variety of more general
disputes. In a lawsuit, including those over misrepresentation, false
promises, or personal injury, the "land in between" is the range of
potential settlement values between the two parties' expected trial
outcomes.3 Since the plaintiff expects to receive the judgment minus
legal fees, and the defendant expects to pay the judgment plus legal
fees, a range of settlement values preferable to both parties over trial
will exist as long as expectations of the judgment do not differ by
more than the sum of the two parties' legal fees.4 In a sales
transaction, the "land in between" is the range of values above the
seller's cost and below the buyer's valuation of the item to be
3See David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J.
Legal Stud. 225, 227 (1994).4For example, if the expected judgment is an even division of the 200 acres and
Annabelle and Barclay would pay $30,000 and $40,000 in additional legal fees respectively if
they proceeded to trial, then after selling the land necessary to cover attorneys' fees, Annabelle
would be left with 70 acres and Barclay with 60. Any division between 71-129 and 139-61 for
Annabelle and Barclay respectively would be preferred by both parties over trial. However, if
both parties expect to receive 140 acres at trial (or any other division that differed by more than
the total attorneys' fees), then out-of-court settlement would not be possible because Annabelle
would expect to be left with 110 acres after trial and Barclay would expect to be left with 100.




purchased.' Any price in that range will yield profit for the seller and
consumer surplus--the difference between the buyer's valuation and
the price--for the buyer.
Section I of this article describes potential sources for
disputes over natural resources. Section m] explains four conditions
for out-of-court settlement, at least one of which must be brought
about by successful settlement devices. Section IV discusses past,
present, and proposed approaches to dispute resolution, and Section
V concludes the article.
II. SOURCES OF DISPUTES OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
The arena of disputes that would be served by improved
resolution techniques encompasses far more than the classic division
of a parcel. Real estate agents face the possibility of litigation both
from the sellers they represent and from the buyers who receive
information from them regarding properties. 6  If an agent sells a
property with an inherent flaw (e.g., location on a fault line, radon
gas, a previous fire) not recognized or not disclosed by the agent,
legal action may follow if the purchaser seeks compensation.
Similarly, litigation might be brought by the seller if the selling price
does not accurately reflect the value of the natural resource due to a
)made after the contract has been completed, andiscovery (e.g., oil) eatrtecnrc  a
unlawful allegiance to the buyer rather than the seller,8 or a self-
interested calculation that taking a low offer early would provide a
larger net profit to the agent than taking a higher offer after additional
advertising, showing of the property, and time.9 In the absence of
settlement-facilitating devices, any such case can impose an undue
burden.
51f the seller of seedlings can obtain them for $1 each and a buyer values seedlings at
$3 each, any sale price between $1 and $3 per seedling will make both parties better off than no
exchange. The task at hand is to decide how the $2 of value in excess of cost will be divided
between the two parties.
6See Sarah Waldstein, A Toxic Nightmare on Elm Street: Negligence and the Real
Estate Broker's Duty in Selling Previously Contaminated Residential Property, 15 B.C. Envir.
Affairs L. Rev. 547 (1988).7The classic example of the latter type of case is Sherwood v. Walker (1887) which
involved the sale of a cow that was mistakenly thought to be sterile. A more recent incident
involved the sale of a baseball card for $15.00 that was valued as $1500.
8Due to related concerns, since January 1, 1996, real estate agents in Kentucky have
had to clarify their allegiance on forms signed by the buyers and the sellers they deal with.
9For example, with a commission rate of 6 percent, a realtor would be better off
taking an early offer of $200,000 for a wilderness tract than committing $2,000 worth of
additional advertising and time to find a buyer willing to pay $225,000. Although the higher
payment would benefit the resource owner, the realtor's $1,500 gain in commission would fall
below the additional $2,000 in selling expenses.
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Personal injury cases pose an additional threat to anyone
responsible for natural resources.'0 The possibilities of accidental
drowning, avalanche, cave collapse, and falls from cliffs and ledges
all present resource owners with exposure to litigation." The
uncapped potential of judgments and the need for extensive attorney
involvement weigh heavily on insurance costs and direct litigation
expenses.' 2 It is clear that every injury case is different in regard to
the safety precautions taken by resource owners (their efforts to
eradicate or warn of hunting, ice, and water hazards, etc.) and the
behavior of claimants. Although differing awards would seem
appropriate in heterogeneous cases, it may be that the legal costs
involved in trying each case separately absorb more than the resulting
differentials. In other words, even though a pianist might receive
$40,000 in compensation for a broken hand while a teacher receives
$25,000, it is likely that the cost of litigating the case would exceed
the extra $15,000 gained by the pianist, leaving her worse off than if
she received $25,000 in a pre-trial settlement. Thus, one solution to
litigation over personal injury cases would be to standardize the
award for each type of injury. Until such a standard is accepted, and
for those unique cases to which standard awards would not apply,
alternative dispute resolution techniques are needed.
Of course, every example of the above sources of conflict
need not result in a dispute. In any given case it is possible, and even
probable, that the parties will have a common understanding of what
a reasonable settlement is and compatible ideas about how to divide
the savings that result from avoiding trial. In such cases there is no
need for mechanism designed to encourage out-of-court settlement.
Unfortunately, every party to a conflict is not reasonable and rational,
expectations for trial judgments and attorneys' fees are not always
compatible, and optimism and greed tend to separate the interests of
potential disputants. The purpose of the settlement devices discussed
in this article is to resolve the disputes that are headed to trial for such
reasons, and to assist disputants who would otherwise settle to reach
faster and fairer agreements.
"See e.g., Don Jacobs, Officials Say this is the First Fatal Attack by Black Bear in
Southeast, Knoxville News-Sentinel I (May 22, 2000).
"For example in the state of Mississippi, falls and drowning represented 39 and 14
percent of non-highway-related accidental deaths respectively in 1996. See Mississippi State
University Extension Service, Non-Highway Causes ofAccidental Deaths, (last visited June 12,
2000) <http://www.ext.msstate.edu/anr/engineering/agrability/slide7text.html>.
2James S. Kakalik and Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort
Litigation (Institute for Civil Justice, 1993); Robert W. Sturgis, Tort Cost Trends: An
International Perspective (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 1995).
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Ill. CONDITIONS FOR SETTLEMENT
The development and assessment of effective dispute
resolution techniques requires an understanding of those conditions
which provide a remedy for litigation. Out-of-court settlement can
occur if at least one of the following sets of conditions is met:
The parties can agree on, or be forced to submit to, a decision
rule or process of division;
3
There is agreement over the expected judgment at trial, the
savings from not going to trial, and the portion of the
savings that each party should receive.' 4  (If accurate
measurement of the resource is not assured, there must
also be agreement over the division that creates the
desired apportionment.); 5
There are differing perceptions of the expected judgment, the
savings from not going to trial, or the agreeable division
of those savings, but relative optimism in some areas is
sufficiently balanced by relative pessimism in others to
produce an acceptable solution;'
6
One party is capable and willing to make a credible take-it-or
leave-it offer that is preferable to the other party over the
trial outcome. 17
Successful dispute resolution will result from techniques that
satisfy one of these four conditions. The aim of past dispute
resolution efforts has sometimes strayed from viable solutions such
as these, resulting in settlement rules such as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68 which appear to have settlement-inducing
13See David A. Anderson, An Introduction to Dispute Resolution, in David A.
Anderson (ed.), The Economics of Legal Relationships 1, 8 (1996).
"'They could also disagree over the division of the resource itself, despite agreement
over the expected trial judgment. However, an offer cannot diminish the offeree's gain by more
than the offeree's savings from settlement, because if it did, the offeree would be better off
going to trial than accepting the offer. Thus, when there is an agreed-upon expected judgment,
disagreements over the division of the resource can be subsumed into disagreements over the
division of the savings from trial.




J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
characteristics, but turn out to be disappointing because they do not
satisfy any of the conditions for settlement.18
IV. PAST AND PRESENT REMEDIES
A. Decision Rules and Processes of Division
1. Brute Force and Compliance
Condition 1 describes a situation in which adherence to a
decision rule or process, by acceptance or force, produces a remedy
for a dispute. The catalyst might be a third-party mediator or
arbitrator whose decision each side has consented to, or a leader with
adequate military or other backing to enforce such decisions.' 9 The
American civil justice system serves a similar role, with the support
of law enforcement agencies.20 War is the most primitive and costly
means of defining property rights, and continues to be prominent in
international disputes when no authority can enforce the results of
civilized dispute resolution processes.2 ' Over 566,000 American
lives were lost in the five largest U.S. conflicts, 22 and worldwide
military expenditures approach one trillion dollars annually.23 -On a
smaller scale, fighting in the form of feuds and duels is a solution at
last resort for two sides hopelessly unable to reconcile.
Unfortunately, like a large or lengthy legal battle, these solutions
threaten to destroy more than the value of the sought-after resources.
'aEvidence on Settlement Devices: Does Rule 68 Encourage Settlement See
Anderson, supra note 3; David A. Anderson & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Empirical? 71 Chi-Kent
L Rev 519 (1995); Tai-Yeong Chung, Settlement of Litigation under Rule 68: An Economic
Analysis, 25 J Legal Stud 261 (1995); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15
J Legal Stud 110 (1986); and Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & David A. Anderson, One-Way Fee
Shifting Statutes and Offer of Judgment Rules: An Empirical Experiment, 36 Jurimet J 255
(1996). 9For example, CDR Associates in Boulder, Colorado, specializes in "successfully
facilitating agreements" over environmental issues such as natural resource extraction policies,
wildlife management, and the location of pipelines and nuclear plants. See CDR Associates,
Environmental Conflict Management, (last visited June 13, 2000)
< http://www.mediate.org/Services.Epp.htm>.20See David A. Anderson, Government's Role in Property Ownership, in Nicholas
Mercuro and Warren J. Samuels (eds.), The Fundamental Interrelationships Between
Government and Property 37, 41 (1998).21Among the daily reminders of this, What's News World Wide, Wall Street Journal
1 (June 12, 2000), reads, "Fighting in a Congo city ended in a victory by Rwandan troops over
Ugandan ex-allies in a bloody weeklong struggle for Kisangani."22U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1998, 367
(1998).
2U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures




An historical perspective on dispute resolution reveals a
tradition of violent decision processes. Duels settled disputes over
natural resource ownership throughout the Middle Ages. Judicial
combat was legal in many European countries and authorized by the
church in France to determine the ownership of disputed segments of
its own natural resources.24 The threat of costly wars and duels, like
the threat of trials, helps to remove the deleterious effects of
optimism, which separate the expectations of parties to a dispute.
When the threat of combat is not enough to foster acceptance of
settlement offers, the actuality of fights and duels can decide a
dispute. Unfortunately, sometimes the battle must be fought to lend
credibility to future threats. And worse, ego and pride often carry
priorities away from the maximization of tangible resources.
Like physical fighting, the substantial costs associated with
solving disputes within the civil justice system make it an effective
motivator for settlement by alternative means.25 In that role, the
courts deter some potential frivolous claims and encourage a large
majority of claimants to settle before trial.26 By similar reasoning one
might argue that trial should be more lengthy and expensive, thus
inhibiting more suits. Higher litigation costs encourage greater
tolerance and fewer frivolous suits, but inhibit impecunious plaintiffs
with meritorious suits and may lead people to take the law into their
own hands if alternatives are not provided. If higher costs are
deemed desirable, an alternative to permitting inefficiency in the civil
justice system would be to tax disputes and give the receipts to a
worthy cause.
2. Fair Division
Issues of asset division can sometimes be settled without the
need for negotiations or trial. The mutual acceptance of a decision
rule or the authority of a physical or political power can facilitate
such a solution. Decision rules that are sometimes acceptable include
those based on tradition (privilege to the first born), rules of thumb
(women and children first, older is wiser), drawing straws, religious
teachings, precedent, flipping a coin, first-come-first-serve, and so
24For a surprisingly thorough and enlightening discussion of judicial combat, See
Duel, Microsoft Encarta, (1994).
2sSee Kakalik & Pace and Sturgis, supra note 12.
26See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability (Harvard U Press, 199 1).
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on. 27 Various contests of strength or bravery have been used for the
same purpose.28
The success of unforced decision rules is inversely related to
the size of the stakes. When the stakes are large, it becomes
worthwhile for parties who might be disadvantaged by traditional
rules to forego the rules' convenience in favor of a more involved
battle for privilege. A corporation might accept the ruling of local
precedence to determine who will sponsor the clean up of a small
dump allegedly created by that company in the past. In contrast, if
plaintiffs claim the dump contaminated water supplies and caused
wrongful deaths, it is likely that arduous settlement negotiations or a
more authoritative determination will be needed to supplant unforced
decision rules.
While small-scale, all-or-nothing allotments can generally be
handled with simple decision rules, the division of larger resources or
responsibilities can sometimes be handled with rules that are thought
to produce a fair allocation between the parties. When equal division
between two parties is the goal and the features of a resource are
valued equally by the competing parties, simple solutions exist. If
the resource is easily measured, as with uniform land by a surveyor,
equal division is a straightforward matter of giving each party their
share. If the resource is not uniform or a reliable measuring device is
not available, a divide-and-choose method can sometimes render a
division between two adversaries. 29 This solution allows one party to
divide the resource into two parts and the other to choose between the
two allotments. The divider has an incentive to make as equal a
division as possible in order to maximize the value of the inferior (if
not equal) part which will be left for her. This technique has been
used in the past to divide such natural resources as sections of the
ocean floor among competing interests.30
The equitable appeal of the divide-and-choose method
diminishes when the parties place differing valuations on the
resources to be divided. In the case of Annabelle and Barclay, in
2 7See Steven J. Brains and Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to
Dispute Resolution, (Cambridge U. Press, 1996).
28Examples include jousting, duels, fist-fighting and even football. Circa 1975
police and hippies clashed over the recreational use of a football field in East Lansing,
Michigan. They settled the dispute with a "Pigs vs. Freaks" football game. (The freaks won.)
Personal correspondence with Robert T. Anderson, Mich. State U emeritus professor, June 14,
2000. As another example, the c. 1000 BCE contest of strength between David and Goliath
stemmed from a dispute over Palestinian iron works. I Samuel 17:3-6, New Oxford Annotated
Bible, revised standard version, (Oxford U. Press, 1993).
29See Brains and Taylor, supra note 27.3 0Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United
Nations, Oceans and Law of the Sea: Deep Seabed Minerals (DOALOS, 1998).
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which Annabelle wants the parcel of land with the lake and Barclay
wants the parcel with the trees, the divider would have an unfair
advantage over the chooser. If Barclay divided, he would divide the
property so that the majority of the land between the forest and the
lake fell on the side of the forest, knowing that Annabelle would
accept fewer acres in exchange for the lake. If Annabelle divided,
she would do the opposite, gaining her favored lake and the majority
of the land by forcing Barclay to trade acreage for the forest.
When the parties are acting prudently, or at least expecting
that the other(s) are acting prudently, 31 an alternative to the divide-
and-choose method can provide an equitable division of a uniform
but hard-to-measure asset. Suppose 200 acres are to be divided
evenly between Annabelle, Barclay, and their aunt Chelsea. A
solution would be to have someone walk across the land, with a rule
that any of the three could call out "stop" at any time, and the caller's
share would be the land the walker had already passed. Clearly,
after the first share had been claimed, the remaining two parties
would call out when the walker was halfway across the remaining
land. If the walker were less than halfway across, calling out would
leave the other party with more. If the walker were more than
halfway across, both would want to claim the land behind him before
the other captured the advantage. The choice when the walker begins
is thus between the land behind him and half of the land not yet
walked. If less than one-third of the land has been walked, then more
than two-thirds (more than one-third for each of the last two callers)
has not been walked, and it pays to wait. If more than one-third has
been walked, less than two-thirds remains (less than one-third for
each of the last two callers), and it pays to call out.
The arguments presented above can be extended to any
number of parties: the theoretical result of the "Say Stop" division
method with n players is that someone will say stop whenever, to the
best of any party's knowledge, l1/nd of the land has been covered by
the walker. The division may not be perfect, but when there is no
satisfactory objective measure, this method divides the resource to
the best of the adversaries' honest abilities. Similar methods can be
used to divide resources that involve difficult-to-quantify tradeoffs
between two or more characteristics that the parties value equally.
For example, forested land for which it is difficult to quantify the
tradeoff between acreage and tree density. If the two parties have the
3 1Herve Moulin, Game Theory for the Social Sciences (NYU Press, 1986) defines a
prudent strategy as one that maximizes the minimum gain by a particular player.32For a description and history of similar division procedures, See Brains and Taylor,
supra note 27.
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same preferences for acreage and tree density, prudent players of the
"Say Stop" game will claim the land behind the walker as soon as it
is equivalent in value to the land ahead of the walker. Thus, timely
and fair division is again attained at minimal expense.
Like "Divide and Choose," the "Say Stop" method does not
result in a fair outcome when dividing a heterogeneous resource
between parties with unequal valuations of the differentiating
characteristic. The advantage will go to the party who prefers the
type of land that the walker starts on. If the walker starts on the side
of the forest Barclay covets, Barclay will wait to say stop until the
walker has reached the point where Annabelle is just short of
indifference between the side with the forest and the side with the
lake, at which point the side with the forest will have a larger portion
of the middle ground attached (in order to make Annabelle indifferent
between that parcel and the one with the lake). Likewise, Annabelle
would gain the advantage if the walker started on the side of the lake.
Dividing a resource becomes increasingly difficult when
equality is not the goal. For example, if seniority, severity of injury,
or degree of fault makes an unequal division appropriate, the fair
division rules discussed above no longer provide an appropriate
solution. The questions to be answered in such a case are: What
portion of the resource to be divided should each party receive? and,
What constitutes that portion? If for some reason it is clear that
Annabelle should receive seventy-five percent of the 200 acres, and if
her 150-acre share can be measured with accuracy, there is no need
for dispute resolution techniques. However, if either the proportional
allocation or the measurement of the resource is in question,33
subjective solutions may be necessary. The remedy may include
negotiations and bargaining, arbitration or mediation, and settlement
or judgment. Attorneys may be hired, formal claims may be filed,
and the costly process of offers, demands, threats and counter claims
may begin.3 4 As time passes, the potential gains from out-of-court
settlement will dissolve into legal fees and lost time and energy. The
sections below discuss methods of minimizing the damage from
subjective solutions and avoiding the ultimate authorities for credible
and enforceable dispute resolution in modem America, judges and
juries.
33Although measurement is seldom a problem with land, disputes can arise over the
measurement of less uniform assets such as land with varying topography, improvements, or
biodiversity. In a related example, China and the Philippines are involved in a dispute over the
division of the mineral rich Spratlys Islands. See Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the
Sea, In the News (January 4, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/los-news.htm#currentdisp>.
3See Kakalik and Pace and Sturgis, supra note 12.
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B. Full Information and Agreement
In order for disputants to comply with the second condition,
they must agree on the likely judgment at trial, the additional
attorneys' fees each side would pay if they proceeded to trial, the
appropriate split of the gains from settlement, and the measurement
of the land. For example, consider the 200 acres with a market value
of $1000 per acre that Annabelle and Barclay are in a dispute over. If
both sides agreed that the trial judgment would provide 100 acres to
each party, that additional attorneys' fees would be $30,000 and
$40,000 for Annabelle and Barclay respectively, and that the gains
from settlement should be split evenly, then settlement is obtainable
without further assistance. They can divide the land the way they
expect a judge would, and divide the $70,000 in attorneys' fees saved
by avoiding trial by transferring $5000 (or five acres) from Barclay to
Annabelle. Satisfying this condition is thus a matter of
approximating full information and rationality, and fostering
agreement over the proportions deserved by each party.
The first obstacle to agreement over an expected judgment is
the wide range of possibilities for its value. For example, in 1993 the
awards in personal injury cases involving cervical/lumbar strain
ranged from zero to one million dollars with a mean of about $50,000
and a standard deviation from the mean of about $135,000.36
Variations in judgments could be decreased with caps on personal
injury and punitive damages, a movement away from jury trials, and
any standardization of awards for particular infractions or injuries.
Optimism and misinformation further complicate disputants'
ability to attain similar expectations. 37  Remedies for inaccurate
expectations for trial and exaggerated perceptions of bargaining
power include the encouragement or requirement of forums for
information sharing and third-party evaluation.38 A wide variety of
alternative dispute resolution techniques are currently available.39
35The motivation for such a transfer is that, given Annabelle's requirement that she
receive half of the savings from trial, the alternative for Barclay is prolonged bargaining and
additional costs, and if they end up in court, the loss of the whole $40,000. Since Barclay has
more to lose (in attorney's fees) by proceeding to trial than Annabelle, he is in a weaker
bargaining position, and can expect to have to share some of his savings from settlement.36Based on jury verdict reports compiled by this author from the Westlaw database.
37See Anderson, supra note 3 at 228.
38For a discussion of contract- and court-mandated arbitration, see Mette H. Kurth,
The Dawning of Arbitration Techniques, in David A. Anderson (ed.) Dispute Resolution:
Bridging the Settlement Gap 193 (JAI Press, 1996).39For an overview of alternative dispute resolution techniques, see Gary B. Charness,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Settlement Gap, in David A. Anderson (ed.) Dispute
Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap 205 (JAI Press, 1996).
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Summary jury trials are highly abbreviated trials that provide litigants
with an advisory verdict for guidance in their settlement
negotiations.40  Court-annexed arbitration generally consists of a
brief, non-binding hearing before a panel of attorneys or retired
judges.41 In mediation, there is no third-party judgment, but one or
more mediators talk with the parties to help them come to
settlement.42 Early neutral evaluation brings the lawyers together
with a neutral party shortly after the claim is filed to talk through the
strengths and weaknesses of their cases and clarify possible
outcomes.43 Similarly, a judicial settlement conference brings the
lawyers together with a judge or magistrate to try to resolve the case
short of trial.44 Alternative dispute resolution techniques such as
these are required in some classes of civil suits and could be better
utilized in others.45
C. Differing but Compatible Perspectives
Condition 3 replaces the requirement of full information with
a requirement that differences in the parties' perspectives be
compatible. Relative optimism regarding the expected judgment
might be accompanied by relative pessimism regarding the
appropriate division of the savings from avoiding trial to make a
range of settlement offers acceptable to both sides. This opportunity
arises because the judgment depends on the merits of each party's
case while the division of the savings depends on the parties' relative
bargaining power, and either party might over- or underestimate
either characteristic of their situation. For example, if Annabelle
expects to receive 120 acres and Barclay expects to receive 100 acres
at trial, settlement is still possible if Annabelle expects $20,000 out of
the $70,000 in savings from avoiding trial and Barclay expects
$30,000 in savings. Barclay's total demand is valued at $130,000
($100,000 worth of land plus $30,000 worth of savings), and
Annabelle's total demand is $140,000, ($120,000 + $20,000), so the
two demands totaling $270,000 are compatible given the $200,000
worth of land and $70,000 in savings to be had. In other words, it is
agreeable to both parties for Annabelle to receive 120 acres and
$20,000 in savings, because although Barclay would end up with 80
acres rather than the 100 he expected, he will be compensated for this
40See id. at 213.
41See id. at 214.
42See id. at 216.
43See id. at 218.
"See id. at 217.
45See Kurth, supra note 38 at 199.
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loss by an equivalent gain of $20,000 more than he expected out of
the savings from settlement.
In order to foster settlement between parties who are not
initially compatible, new rules of civil procedure could be introduced
which lower demands, increase offers, or otherwise satisfy one of the
four conditions for settlement explained above. The American Rule,
the English Rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, and many
parallel state court rules have met with limited success in terms of
encouraging parties with manageable differences to negotiate or
tolerate, and not litigate.46 These rules and some of their pitfalls are
described below. The section that follows explains two alternative
rules that could equitably resolve conflicts despite incompatible self-
perceptions of the parties' bargaining strengths.
The American Rule. Under the traditional "American rule,"
each party pays its own attorney's fees regardless of the trial
outcome.47 The losing party, defined as the defendant in the event of
any positive verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
otherwise, is assessed court costs other than attorneys' fees, including
reasonable court fees, transcript costs, printing costs, and witness
fees. This rule generally applies to litigation costs even when
supplemental rules governing attorneys' fees are in effect.48 Because
court costs are typically negligible, this rule amounts to a slap on the
wrist for parties who fail to settle and fail in court.
The English Rule.49 The English rule is similar to the
American rule, but it places a greater burden on the losing party.
Under the English rule, the loser pays not only court costs, but also
reasonable attorneys' fees for both sides. This larger penalty for
losing a case will discourage frivolous cases, but it may also
discourage justified claims by parties who could not afford the
downside risk that the judgment might be against them. For this and
related reasons, the English rule has not been adopted in American
courts.
Rule 68.50 A typical settlement rule allows a party in
litigation to formalize an offer to settle out of court. If the opposing
"See Anderson and Rowe, supra note 18.47See id. at 257.
4SSee id. at 259.
49For further explanation and discussion of the English Rule, see Mark S. Stein, The
English Rule with Client-to-Lawyer Risk Shifting: A Speculative Appraisal, 71 Chi Kent L Rev
603 (1995).
50The full text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 reads:
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party refuses the offer and does not improve on it at trial, then the
refusing party suffers a consequence. Existing Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68 mandates that defendants collect post-offer court costs,
but usually not attorneys' fees, from the plaintiff if the refused offer is
not improved upon at trial. 5' Since Rule 68 creates the added threat
that the plaintiff will have to pay the defendant's costs at trial, the
plaintiff is more likely to accept any given offer. Unfortunately,
rather than making the same offers she would make in the absence of
Rule 68, the defendant is likely to offer to pay less as a result of her
improved bargaining power. Settlement is not promoted when both
the maximum offer and the minimum demand decrease by similar
amounts, thus, the existing Rule 68 is underused and ineffective in
encouraging settlement.52
Jurists and policymakers have proposed changes in Rule 68
intended to strengthen the Rule and remove its one-sided contribution
to the defendant's bargaining power. In 1984, 1985, and again in
1995, the federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules considered
"two-sided" versions of Rule 68 that would make it available to
plaintiffs as well as defendants, and "fee-shifting" versions that
would increase the sanction for refusing an offer that is not improved
on at trial from court costs to court costs plus post-offer attorneys'
fees.53 William W Schwarzer proposed a similar revision that would
also limit the total amount of attorneys' fees shifted as the result of
Rule 68 to the amount by which the jury verdict was superior to the
rejected offer.54 Two-sided rules would eliminate the pro-defendant
bias of the existing Rule 68, and the inclusion of a fee-shifting
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may
serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party
for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If
within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer
is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of
service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine
costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the
offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to
another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the
liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make
an offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is
served within reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to
determine the amount or extent of liability. F.R.C.P. 68.
511d.
52See Anderson, supra note 3 at 226.53For an overview of past Rule 68 controversies, See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., & Neil
Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 13, 14 (1988).
54Schwarzer W William, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to Reducing
the Cost of Litigation, 76 Judicature 147 (1992).
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consequence would bring more attention to the rule, but none of these
revisions have been shown to close the cap between the offers and
demands of litigants who would otherwise go to trial.55 Further
research is needed to determine whether Rule 68 can be modified to
successfully encourage settlement.
D. Final Offers
The assumption that a party in litigation can dictate the end
of bargaining with one final offer, the refusal of which will result in
the parties going to trial, is common in modem law and economics
literature. 6 Condition 4 stipulates that one party be able to extend
such a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If a credible final offer can be made,
assuming the parties are rational and seek to maximize the expected
value of their net gain, the offeror will make an offer slightly superior
to the offeree's expected outcome from trial. If they agree on the
expected judgment, the offer might be to divide the resource as the
court would and give an arbitrarily small portion, say one dollar, of
the savings from avoiding trial to the offeree. (Effectively this means
the offeree must give the offeror all but one dollar of the money that
would go towards the offeree's attorney fee if they proceeded to
trial.) Since bargaining cannot continue (by definition of the final
offer), the offeree will select the settlement offer over the option to
continue to trial for lesser gain.
Take-it-or-leave-it offers are not credible unless it is in the
offeror's best interest to carry them out. After the rejection of any
offer that would make the offeror better off than going to trial, further
bargaining over settlement values between the rejected offer and the
trial outcome would be beneficial to the offeror. For example, if both
sides expect to receive 100 acres at trial, and Barclay rejects
Annabelle's "final" offer to settle out of court for 100 acres plus all
but a dollar of Barclay's avoided attorney's fees, Annabelle would
prefer to accept any alternative cash transfer from Barclay, or even to
transfer an amount up to the $30,000 she stands to save in attorney's
fees to Barclay, rather than going to trial with the expectation of
receiving 100 acres and paying $30,000. It is thus difficult to make a
credible last offer, as well as undesirable from the standpoint of
55See Anderson, Anderson and Rowe, Chung, Miller, and Rowe and Anderson.
supra note 18.
"Recent examples include Lucian Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement
Offer, 17 J. Legal Stud. 437 (1988); and Kathryn Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of
Fee-Shifting Rules, 25 Rand J. of Econ. 197 (1994).
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fairness, because the offeror gains an inequitable portion of the
bargaining rent.
The Sincerity Rule.57 Although final offers could be made
credible with the support of the legal system, in its simplest form, this
remedy would convey a tremendous advantage to the party granted
the right to make a legally enforced final offer. The Sincerity rule
provides a more equitable, yet relatively simple solution based on a
credible last offer. The Sincerity rule is so named for its ability to
induce a "sincerely fair" offer. The rule provides incentives for
equitable settlement offers despite bargaining inequities when at least
one party is willing to settle for an amount near the opposing party's
expectation for the judgment. Under the Sincerity rule, either party
can make an offer. The offeree can either accept the offer, or reject
it, in which case the parties proceed to trial with no further
opportunity to bargain and the offeror will pay the offeree's
reasonable post-offer fees.
The incentive to make an acceptable Sincerity offer comes
from the desire to avoid submission to unreasonable offers from a
well positioned opponent, or payment of the additional costs and fees
associated with trial. If the offeror offers an amount slightly better
than the offeree's expected judgment, the offeree (unless she has a
disposition for taking chances) will accept it. If the offeror offers an
amount inferior to the offerees expected judgment, the offeree can
choose to proceed to trial at no additional cost, and the offeror must
pay post-offer attorneys' fees for both sides. Acceptable offers are
thus expected in the vicinity of the offeree's expected judgment.
The Sincerity rule could provide an equitable solution to
unfair demands in the dispute between Barclay and Annabelle.
Suppose that a judgment of 100 acres per person is expected by both
parties, but there is disagreement over the division of the savings
from avoiding trial. Knowing that Barclay has political aspirations
and can hardly afford the negative media exposure associated with a
trial, Annabelle is demanding that she receive $25,000 of Barclay's
savings from avoiding trial in exchange for settlement. Rather than
accepting Annabelle's demand as he would if the alternative were
trial, Barclay could make a Sincerity offer of 100 acres per person
plus one dollar (or any arbitrarily small amount of cash). This offer
approximates the trial outcome with virtually none of the associated
costs, and if Annabelle seeks to maximize her gain, she will accept it
rather than expecting to receive 100 acres and no cash at trail. Since
"7The Sincerity Rule was introduced in Anderson, supra note 3, and is supported by
empirical results discussed in Anderson and Rowe, supra note 18.
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Sincerity offers are optional, there would be no reason to make such
an offer to a seemingly irrational or spiteful adversary. Sincerity
offers could be used in a variety of situations to avoid trial, an
inequitable settlement, or an equitable settlement after prolonged
strategic bargaining.
The counter-intuitive fee payment to a party who refuses a
Sincerity offer elicits offers at or near the expected trial judgment.
With fees paid and no possibility for further bargaining, a party who
refuses a Sincerity offer will expect to receive the anticipated trial
judgment. Thus, Sincerity offers that exceed the expected judgment
will be accepted by rational, non-risk-loving offerees, and those that
fall below the expected judgment will be refused. This is true even
when one party is in a superior bargaining position and would
otherwise be able to exploit the disadvantaged party to reap unfair
financial gains.
Final Offer Auctions.5 When there are differing
perspectives on the expected judgment or the division of the savings
from settlement, an available if imperfect goal of policymakers is to
promote a settlement that evenly divides the savings from trial and
the difference between the two expectations for the judgment. The
Final Offer Auction method succeeds in this task. This method
allows the two parties to bid for the right to make the final offer, and
the amount of the top bid is transferred to the party who receives the
final offer. If the final offer is rejected, the parties must proceed to
trial with no further bargaining, and each side is responsible for its
own attorneys' fees.
Consider once more the example in which Annabelle and
Barclay each expect to receive 100 acres and pay $30,000 and
$40,000 respectively in additional attorneys' fees at trial. As
explained above, given the right to make a single take-it-or-leave-it
offer, each would offer to settle in exchange for 100 acres plus all but
an arbitrarily small amount, say one dollar, of the fees avoided by
settling. A final offer from Barclay to settle in exchange for an equal
division of the acreage and $29,999 would be accepted by Annabelle
because her alternative is to go to trial and receive 100 acres minus
$30,000. (If the adversary has goals beyond profit maximization, the
final offer might need to be sweetened somewhat to assure
acceptance.) In a final offer auction with both sides expecting the
same judgment, each side would be willing to bid up to one-half of
the savings from trial to make the final offer to the other party. If
Annabelle makes a winning bid of $34,999 and makes the acceptable
58The Final Offer Auction method was introduced in Anderson, supra note 3.
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final offer to settle for an equal division of the land and $39,999 from
Barclay, she will receive half of the land and $39,999 - $34,999 =
$5,000 from Barclay in addition to saving $30,000 herself by
avoiding trial, for a total cash savings of $35,000. In addition to his
100-acre share, Barclay would receive the $34,999 bid minus the
$39,999 transfer to Annabelle, and save $40,000 by avoiding trial, for
a net cash savings equivalent to Annabelle's of $35,000.
If Barclay tops Annabelle's last bid with a bid of $35,000,
Annabelle would not bid more, because by accepting Barclay'
subsequent demand for a 100-100 split of the land plus $29,999 (one
dollar less than Annabelle's savings from avoiding trial) and
receiving his $35,000 bid, Annabelle will receive $5,001 plus the
$30,000 savings from avoiding trial. The inferior alternative is to bid
$35,001 and receive $39,999 (the highest acceptable demand she can
make of Barclay) minus her bid of $35,001 for a gain of $4,998 in
addition to the $30,000 in savings from avoiding trial. Thus, if both
parties act rationally to maximize their net land and cash gain, the
outcome will be a division of the land as the court would and an
equal division of the savings from avoiding trial. Similar reasoning
can be used to demonstrate that Final Offer Auctions yield a division
half-way between two parties' expected trial outcomes when their
expectations are known to differ. As with all of the existing and
proposed rules, settlement is hindered when the parties' expectations
for trial are unknown or differ by more than the total savings from
avoiding trial. 59
V. SUMMARY
Given the life-sustaining importance of natural resources and
the volume of associated disputes, it is incumbent upon the legal
profession to seek and implement efficient solutions. Possible
advancements include settlement-encouraging legal rules, improved
methods of fair resource division, and a decrease in the uncertainty
involved in judgments. Innovative dispute resolution techniques are
available to be applied in the context of natural resources. The
development and dissemination of improved bargaining tools will
ease costly conflicts and resolve a larger number of claims fairly prior
to trial.
Creative rules of fair division will permit subjective
decisions, such as how to divide a tract with varying forest density
"9Note that conditions 2, 3, and 4 described in Section III above are reliant on
compatible expectations among the parties.
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among several equally deserving parties, to be made out of court to
the satisfaction of each party involved. Available-but-underutilized
procedures for early neutral evaluation, summary jury trials, and
settlement conferences can clarify for litigants their benefits from
settlement and their relative bargaining strengths. And new offer-of-
settlement devices including the Sincerity Rule and Final Offer
Auctions stand to reduce opportunities for low-balling and
intimidation that have previously led to unfair settlements. The
implementation of settlement-facilitating practices as described in
this article will foster fair and timely settlements and reduce the
burden of litigation on all of those who benefit from natural
resources--indeed, all of society.

